Con ict situations do not only arise from misunderstandings, erroneous perceptions, partial knowledge, false beliefs etc, but also from di erences in \opinions" and in the di erent agents' value systems. It is not always possible, and maybe not even desirable, to \solve" this kind of con ict, as the sources are subjective. The communicating agents can, however, use knowledge of the opponent's preferences, to try and convince the partner of something. To deal with these situation requires an argumentative capacity, able to handle not only \demonstrative" arguments but also \dialectic" ones, which may not be necessarily based on rationality and valid premises. This paper presents a formalization of a theory of informal argumentation, focused on techniques to change attitudes of the interlocutor, in the domain of health promotion.
Introduction
Con ict is generally de ned as a situation in which two agents (or the same agent in case of internal con ict) hold di erent and incompatible goals (Castelfranchi 1996; Easterbrook et al. 1993) . There is less agreement on how con icts can be solved and what the actual reasons are of the di erence between the agents' goals. Acknowledging discordant beliefs seems to be the most common approach (Gallier 1992; Chu-Carrol & Carberry 1996; Sycara 1988; Reed & Long 1997a; Yang 1992) : misconceptions, misunderstandings, incomplete knowledge all contribute in creating contrasting goals.
The con icts can be solved, if the hypothesis is that the two agents are cooperative, by means of the conversation, enlightening and manifesting the erroneous beliefs and misconceptions and letting the two parties reach common knowledge and an agreement, if possible, on a shared plan.
However, in many real life situations, con icts are not, or at least not completely, due to di erent beliefs about reality, but they can arise from a di erence in the two parties opinions about reality, or the way they di erently value events and circumstances. Often the partners cannot give evidence for their opinions, but they are still claimed, and are at the basis of every day argumentation.
It is not always possible, and maybe not even desirable, to solve these kinds of con ict, as they are subjective and linked to personal factors. Nevertheless, the communicating agents can take advantage of knowing each other preferences and use them in order to try and let the partner see the matter from their own point of view.
To deal with this type of persuasive dialogue requires an argumentative ability able to take into account not only demonstrative proofs but also a dialectic style of reasoning. We refer to Aristotle's meaning of dialectic argument as an argument using premises which are not evidently true, and whose aim is to make the conclusion more acceptable to the addressee, as opposed to a demonstrative reasoning which deals with certainty and valid inferences (Aristotle 1928) . This paper present the formalization of such a theory of informal argumentation, applied to advice giving concerning behavioural changes. Advice giving is a very interesting style of conversation. Di erent from tutoring or information seeking dialogues, the relationships between the two conversants is more likely to be peer-to-peer (Forslund 1995) . They both have their own expertise, even though in di erent areas, and one of the two parties' aim is to help the other with respect to some issue. Moreover, as there may be no particular explicit goal to accomplish, advice giving is also di erent from decision support, where one conversant has to help the other to choose among di erent alternatives, and from collaboration, where the two conversants have to actually perform a task jointly.
An advice giver may have to face situations in which the advisee is not even considering the possibility of needing advice, and the advisor has to overcome scepticism and similar barriers.
A Theory of Informal Argumentation
The Belgian philosophers Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca developed a theory, the New Rhetoric (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) , aimed at identifying \discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind's adherence to the thesis presented for its assert" (cited work, p. 4). Their point of departure was the observation that, in every day life, people rarely produce just a perfect logic proof of their claims, as it is illusory that facts speak from themselves, even when presenting scienti c theories. Moreover, people do not rely on what they know when they argue with an opponent, but rather they try to "justify" their views by appealing to the values and opinions of the people whom they are addressing.
The notion of audience is clearly essential in this context: the same argument can produce very di erent results when addressed to di erent kinds of people. The aim of the orator will then be to identify the characteristics of the audience to which he or she can appeal in order to be more e ective.
The two philosophers' study, rather than establishing an a priori "logic of value judgments", investigated how humans argue, by collecting and classifying arguments that are successful in practice.
This section will brie y explain the basic concepts or their theory.
Argumentation Is Based on Premises
The arguer's discourse is commonly based on a set of premises, or points of departure of the argumentation. The more the premises are shared by the audience, the more successful the argument will be. New Rhetoric does not only focus on premises as facts, but takes into account also the importance the audience attaches to facts. Premises are then classi ed in two sets:
Premises relating to the \real" consisting of:
Facts: statements about reality which require no further justi cation (for instance Apples are fruit). Truths: more complex systems of connections between facts (e.g. scienti c theories). Presumptions: opinions that the audience is likely to accept without a proof, but adherence to them may need to be reinforced (e.g. Fruit is a healthy food).
Premises relating to the \preferable" that, unlike the previous ones, are idiosyncratic of the particular audience the arguer is addressing: Values: statements related to the preference of a particular audience for one thing as opposed to another (for instance a healthy body is very important or natural products have to be preferred 
Argumentation Consists of Schemas
The force of an argument lies not only on the acceptability of its premises, but also on how the arguer connects premises and conclusions. The New Rhetoric is an ordered collection of a number of schemas, that is ways to arrange premises and claims, that are successfully used by people in ordinary discourse. Two wide classes are identi ed:
Argumentation by association is applied when two elements that are separate in the mind of the addressee are put together by the arguer by using a particular relation. Di erent links give raise to di erent styles of schema: 1. Quasi-logical argumentation, using links that "give the impression" that the argument presented has a logical connection between its sub-parts. This is made by using an exposition structure which resembles a logical or a mathematical proof, such as: You said that you only buy cheap things, apples are cheap, so it's perfectly logical to conclude that you should buy apples!. It should be stressed here that the logical connection is only apparent, and that is the reason of the quasi connotation. In a perfectly logical argument, the consequence must follows from the premises (e.g. All cats are mammals, lions are cats, therefore lions are mammals), whereas in the example above the conclusion does not necessarily hold (the addressee may dislike apples!). The arti ce, according 
Transitivity (quasi-logical)
Eating fruit will help slimming.
Italians know all about healthy eating.
Model (establishing structure of reality)
Dissociation
You said that people who are concerned about diet are self-centred, but I prefer to consider them just responsible persons.
Pragmatic (using structure of reality)
Association
Figure 1: Examples of New Rhetoric's schemas to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, is given by the use of elements of ordinary language in a logical relation, in order to make the argument seem stronger. 2. Argumentation based on the structure of the reality, using links about the the reality that the audience perceives as real, such as cause/e ects, object/attribute; group/constituents; means/end etc. The arguer, by expressing the relation, hopes to pass the audience's acceptance from the premises to the conclusion, as in Eating fruit is good because it helps slimming. 3. Argumentation establishing the structure of the reality, using new (for the audience) links between claims, such as by making an example (Fruit is very sweet: consider pineapples), or by appealing to a model, especially to promote an action (Healthy people use to have cereals for breakfast).
Argumentation by dissociation is a more subtle way of presenting an argument: a division is introduced into a concept that the audience considered as a whole. It should not be confused with the opposition to association (the refusal to link two separate elements): in dissociation the audience is presented with just one element, which is then decomposed into two separate elements. For example: You said that people who are concerned about diet are self-centred, but I prefer to consider them just responsible persons. In this case a concept (responsible) is di erentiated from another the audience considered as a whole (self-centred). Dissociation is usually done by introducing new terminology, so it is a \creative" process. Examples of schemas are given in Fig. 1 . The classi cation was subsequently elaborated by Warnick & Kline (1992) , who proposed a collection of coding guidelines which we use in our formalization.
A Language to Represent Behaviours and Values
In order to reason about values and behaviours, as well as facts of the domain, a knowledge representation language was de ned addressing di erent aspects of the model. the knowledge about the speci c domain forms a nutrition knowledge base containing classi cations and instances of foods and basic principles of human nutrition. It was generated by collecting and encoding excerpts from the Manual of Nutrition by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) (1995) plus several lea ets and booklets distributed by the Health Education Board for Scotland and the MAFF. a language describing behavioural changes was de ned, for representing the stages of change and the beliefs about health. It has as basic concepts actions (e.g. \eating fruit"), states (e.g. \having cancer") and individuals. Several relations are de ned among these concepts inspired by the health promotion theories: nally, a core of speech acts allow the two parties to communicate about the previous concepts, for example Assert, Ask, AskIf, AskWhy, Acknowledge, DontUnderstand etc.
Representing Partially Cooperative Agents
A convenient metaphor to represent human-computer conversations considers both the user and the system as individual agents (Kass 1991) each having its own deduction system and its own set of tasks. The system is then designed as one of the participants to the conversation, the other participant(s) being either a human user or another arti cial agent. For this reason, throughout the paper the system, in our case the advisor, will be referred to also as Agent 1, where Agent 2 is its interlocutor.
To successfully interact, each agent has to have a representation of its opponent's set of beliefs. This can consist, in principle, of an unlimited number of nested levels: an agent may reason about its own beliefs (level 0), about what the other agent believes (level 1), about what the other agent believes that it believes (level 2) and so on. In most cases, the actual representation does not include every possible level, but only a xed number, and con ates all the levels beyond these into a unique class representing mutual beliefs. In addition to their practical convenience, mutual beliefs are especially necessary, as Blandford (1993) noticed, when dealing with domains, like ours, in which claims are not necessarily right or wrong. The level of accuracy of the representation, that is the number of nesting levels actually represented in a model, determines how sophisticated the interaction can be.
Some approaches represent virtually every nesting level, for instance the one by Ballim (1992) , who use an ascribing mechanism to dynamically create new nesting classes. This approach is especially suitable when modelling situations in which misconceptions and deceitful behaviour are possible (Lee & Wilks 1997) . However, in a situation of cooperative dialogue, agents are only interested in communicating what they believe, and assume their opponent does the same. This is the simplest communicative situation, and it has been argued (Kobsa 1990; Taylor, Carletta, & Mellish 1995) that only three levels of nesting are su cient to represent it.
In particular, Kobsa (1990) proposes a classi cation which establishes as primitive classes:
class 0: the private beliefs of the agent about facts of the domain (e.g. I believe that apples are fruit);
class 1: the belief of the agent about what is mutually believed to be believed by her partner (e.g. I believe we both believe you believe that apples are fruit); class 2: the agent's beliefs about what her partner believes to be mutually believed about her own beliefs (e.g. I believe we both believe I believe that apples are fruit). In this classi cation, all the odd levels of nesting, that is 1 (I believe you believe X), 3 (I believe you believe I believe you believe X) etc., are con ated into class 1, and all the even ones, that is 2 (I believe you believe I believe X), 4 (I believe you believe I believe you believe I believe X) etc. are con ated into class 2.
In an analogous way, but for di erent purposes, Taylor, Carletta, & Mellish (1995) de ne three di erent basic classes:
class 0: the private beliefs of an agent about facts of the domain (e.g. I believe that apples are fruit); class 1: the belief of the agent about her partner's domain-level beliefs (e.g. I believe you believe that apples are fruit); class 2: the agent beliefs about her partner's beliefs about what the agents believed to be mutually believed, or residual mutual beliefs (e.g. I believe you believe I believe we both believe that apples are fruit); In this classi cation, all the levels beyond level 1 (e.g. 2 = I believe you believe I believe X, 3 = I believe you believe I believe you believe X etc.) are con ated into the third class.
When deception is allowed, or it is needed to \plan for plan recognition", that is to gure out which is the other agent's plan, deeper nesting levels are needed. The two mentioned studies maintain however that even in those cases only few levels of nesting should be added.
But what are the characteristics of our arguing agents? Can they be de ned as cooperative? It should be noticed that some sort of deception is in a sense inherent in the de nition of dialectic argumentation. The fact that the arguer bases his or her justi cation on the audience's beliefs and not on what he or she really thinks on the matter can be seen as a subtle kind of deception. In particular, the arguer may like a claim to pass as his or her own even if it is only a projection of the audience's mind (for example, the claim Eating fruit is important because it helps slimming can be made by an arguer who knows the audience gives a high value to being slim, even if he or she does not).
We then would like our agents to be able to say what they do not think, that is to deceive about their private beliefs; consequently, each agent can decide not to believe what the other agent says about its own private beliefs and needs to be able to represent this situation.
Our system follows the same guidelines used by Kobsa (1990) and Taylor, Carletta, & Mellish (1995) in establishing an a priori number of nesting levels. With our limited type of deception (agents cannot lie about inner levels of nesting beliefs), it will not be necessary to add deeper levels of nesting, but rather to better specify the third level, by splitting it into two sets at the same nesting level. The primitive beliefs classes in our system are then: class 0: the agent's own beliefs (BA 1 ) (e.g. I believe apples are fruit); class 1: the belief of the agent about her partner's domain-level beliefs (BA 1 BA 2 ) (e.g. I believe you believe apples are fruit); class 2.1: the agent's beliefs about what her partner believes to be mutually believed about her own beliefs (BA 1 BA 2 MBBA 1 ) (e.g. I believe you believe that we both believe I believe apples are fruit); class 2.2: the agent's beliefs about what her partner believes to be mutually believed about his beliefs (BA 1 BA 2 MBBA 2 ) (e.g. I believe you believe that we both believe you believe apples are fruit). Case (a) is an example of sincere communication. A speaker can communicate a belief of his own (I believe eating fruit helps slimming) or a belief about his partner (I believe you believe eating fruit helps slimming). If the addressee also perceive the communication as truthful, she will update both the mutual section and the private section of her beliefs about the speaker with the communicated claim. The speaker, on his side, after uttering the sentence, also updates accordingly his mutual section of beliefs about what the hearer believes about himself, assuming then that the communication will be considered sincere.
Case (b) is an example in which the hearer does not consider her partner sincere. She will then update her private section about the speaker beliefs with what she thinks is his real attitude (that is she believes that he does not really think that fruit helps slimming). Nevertheless, the mutual section will contain the actual communication, to mirror what the speaker thinks about the successfulness of his communication.
In case (c) a deceitful communication is detected, whereas (d) is a case of a successful deceit. Notice that in both cases the speaker will consider his deception successful: as Lee & Wilks (1997) pointed out, an agent will deceive only if it is con dent the deceitful claim will be believed.
It should be noticed that case (a) is the only situation in which an inner belief than the rst level is showed: as the assumption is that agents can only lie about their private beliefs about themselves, a communication about inner classes will always be considered honest by the addressee.
Facts and Presumptions in our Belief Model
In what we discussed so far, we did not take into account the important distinction in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's theory between facts and presumptions.
In our approach, the distinction is not made explicit, but it is implicitly rendered by considering the belief class to which a claim belongs.
An agent considers as facts all the beliefs which are classi ed as \mutual" (classes 2.1 and 2.2); presumptions are then an agent's private beliefs about either the domain (class 0) or the opponent (class 1).
It may seem unusual that the system's private beliefs are considered as just \presumptions", but we believe this more realistically represents an argumentative situation. In the majority of interactions between a user and a conventional computer system, user's beliefs are considered as fewer than system's, both in qualitative and in quantitative terms. The system being the expert in the conversation domain, every time there is a disagreement between system's and user's knowledge, it is considered as a user's misconception. And all the concepts that the user is modelled to have (at least in the considered domain) form a subset of system's ones. As Hustadt (1994) pointed out, however, this is not a good approach when the personal attitude towards the topic is an important subject of discussion.
In our simulation, the de nition of facts and presumptions are given in terms of the argumentation theory, so it relies on how the claims are perceived by the interlocutor. In these terms, the system cannot be considered to know the truth, but it only communicates its opinions, being prepared to give evidence for them, if necessary, or even to withdraw them. As the New Rhetoric established, \what the arguer] says is not \Gospel truth", he does not possess that authority ...]. He acknowledges that he must use persuasion, think of argument capable of acting on his interlocutor, show some concern for him and be interested in his state of mind" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 16) . The result of a such a di erentiation between facts and presumptions is used in the planning module, as it will be showed later, so that belonging to a class or another makes a given claim a stronger or weaker premise for an argument.
Daphne: Dialectical Argumentation for Providing Healthy Nutrition Education
The belief model presented in the previous sections constitutes the core of an architecture for an arguing agent, Daphne, as shown in Fig. 3 . The main components of the agent are:
Reasoning unit responsible for managing the factual knowledge of the agent, about the domain and the opponent.
Planning unit responsible for producing the communicative actions, that is messages to be delivered to the opponent.
Dialogue unit responsible for the actual communication between the two parties. Agent central unit whose aim is to activate and coordinate all the others; there is no explicit mention of it in Fig. 3 , but its role can be represented by the dashed lines between the various components.
Reasoning Unit
The Reasoning Unit deals with agent's beliefs about the domain and the opponent. Reasoning in each belief model class is made by means of a problem solver, coupled with a reason maintenance system to help dealing with potentially withdrawable information. The problem solver is based on a clausal form logic, but restricted to Horn clauses 1 , mainly for e ciency purpose (Dowling & Gallier 1984) . It has also been argued (Taylor, Carletta, & Mellish 1996) that, together with the use of limited depth of belief nesting, representing justi cations by means of Horn clauses allows the reasoning process to be more \humanlike", as humans are notoriously not clever in dealing with disjunctions of elements (for instance the phrase Either it rains or I will go out sounds somewhat odd for most people). On the other hand, humans make an extensive use of negations, which are not considered valid in the Horn formalization: the phrase above is certainly less unusual if expressed as If it doesn't rain, I will go out.
It therefore appears important to allow the opponent of Daphne to give justi cation using plain clause form, not just Horn clauses. Justi cations given by the user are not used by the problem solver, so there is no need to change the problem solver's way of reasoning; but they are massively used by the reason maintenance module to determine the set of beliefs which are currently held.
The reason maintenance mechanism used is de Kleer's Assumption-based Truth Maintenance System (ATMS) (de Kleer 1986a). In particular, the algorithm for the implementation of label propagation used is the one described in (de Kleer 1988) . To deal with the opponent's general way to express justi cation, an extension to the ATMS is used (de Kleer 1986b) that can represent clauses containing negations, by introducing the concept of disjunction, or Choose, among assumptions.
Planning Unit
The conversation in Daphne is the result of a planning process, as it is commonly the case for many dialoguing systems (Allen et al. 1995; Carletta 1992; Cawsey 1992; Chu-Carrol & Carberry 1994; Moore & Paris 1993; Taylor 1994) . 1 that is clauses formed by a conjunction of positive elements as premises and just one or none positive element as conclusion.
Inference Rules ATMSs
Belief Model Both Daphne's overall goals (e.g. argue about a topic, let the addressee progress from one stage of change to another with respect to an action, etc.) and the goals deriving from the discourse's obligations (eg. answer questions) are solved by a planning mechanism, which decomposes them into a sequence of communicative actions. Several goals can be active at the same time, constituting an agenda of tasks to choose from.
Planning is hierarchical, in two di erent ways: a conceptual hierarchy is de ned among the domain operators, by classifying them according to abstraction spaces. Distinct sets of abstraction spaces are historically used (Sacerdoti 1974; Fox & Long 1995; Washington 1994) in order for a problem to be rst solved in a high level space, and then re ned at successively more detailed levels. Each space represents, in a sense, a di erent type of knowledge. The neat distinction among Daphne's tasks and sources of knowledge which led us to identify di erent types of knowledge, as seen in Sect. 4, naturally suggested three abstraction spaces:
{ The high level space, or strategist, is concerned about the general goals of the system, for instance to promote health behavior, to inform about risks and so on; this space formalizes the knowledge necessary to plan for in uencing a behaviour change in the opponent, and embeds knowledge from both the Stages of Change and the Health Belief models as well as nutrition concepts.
{ The middle level space, or tactician, is concerned about the argumentative skills of the system, which are in a sense independent from the subject of the argumentation, and embeds knowledge from the New Rhetoric domain.
{ The bottom level space, or orator, has strictly linguistic knowledge: it is concerned about how to express, in natural language, the argument proposed by the tactician.
a structural hierarchy is de ned which divides the planning process into three planning layers (Ste k 1981 
Orator's operator to claim a topic. Figure 4 : Some planning operators a meta-planning layer, whose aim is to control the applicability of domain operators, by checking prerequisites and executing goal decomposition. At the top of the hierarchy, a scheduler layer is responsible for controlling the overall process, by activating new goals, choosing among alternatives, deciding at which space level to replan in case of a failure, that is whether to change the phrasing of the argument (orator) the structure of it (tactician) or even the subject (strategist), and so on. Operators at any abstraction level have the following structure:
Goal: the goal it aims to achieve; it can be either a belief to induce or a task to accomplish; Prerequisites: the conditions that have to be veri ed before the operator can be applied; each prerequisite can be tried to be planned for, if it is not veri ed; Decomposition: the description of how the goal is decomposed into subgoals.
Some example of operators are given in Fig. 4 . The rst one is a strategic operator: to encourage the addressee to pass from the Precontemplator to the Contemplator stage of change with respect to the action ?act, a possibility is to present a state that the action can prevent. To this aim, the tactician is asked to argue pragmatically about the action and the state.
The following four are tactician operators. Each tactician operator is connoted by a plus or a minus depending on whether it is meant to argue in favour or against the topic, which is the rst of the goal's parameters.
The second operator in Fig. 4 performs a pragmatic argumentation in favour of the action ?act. The pragmatic argumentation is connoted by a Neg, in the sense that it is asked to emphasize a state that the action prevents, rather than one that the action achieves. For the operator to succeed, it should search for a perspective from which the given state is Bad.
The third one represents an argument establishing the structure of reality: argumentation by model. An action is promoted by claiming that it is a habit of a person who represents a model for the listener. Notice that the fact of being a model has to be a fact for the listener (it belongs to the mutual section of the arguer's beliefs), otherwise the strength of the argument will be weakened.
In the fourth example, an argument by dissociation is presented. The prerequisites state that it is a fact (mutual section) that the given topic is Bad from a given perspective. It is asked therefore to look for two subtopics of the given topic, such that one of them is Good from the same perspective, in order to di erentiate them. One of the subtopics (?subtopic1) should be easily recognizable (e.g. is a fact) by the addressee as an instance of the given topic, so that the negative value can be inherited from the general instance. On the other hand, the second subtopic can even be unknown to the addressee, and the tactician can plan for showing that it is valuable, if the preconditions concerning it are not met.
The fth example shows a tactician operator in which the goal is a belief to induce, rather than a task. It is the most general type of tactic, and there are several of them, one for each argumentative technique implemented. The tactician will typically use them in order to promote a certain fact for which it has not received a precise suggestion about the way to do it, by trying each of them until the decomposition of one of them can be red.
Finally, the last operator in Fig 4 is taken from the orator abstraction level, and state that in order to claim a certain topic it is su cient to Assert it, where Assert is one of the basic speech acts.
Examples of the application of these operators are given in Sect. 7. The planning process is incremental, as execution and planning are interleaved. This approach, rst envisaged by Sacerdoti (1974) and thoroughly developed by Ambros Ingerson (1987) for general planners, is particularly useful in discourse planners, both because, as Young & Simon (1987) argued, communicative actions cannot be undone, so it is relatively safe to execute them, and because speaking without planning too much ahead makes the system behavior more humanlike. It is responsibility of the scheduler layer to decide when to stop planning and start executing, and vice-versa.
Dialogue Unit
As the emphasis of the system is on dialectics, dialogue ability has a crucial importance and it should show the characteristics that would be reasonably expected in a discussion between two arguers. However, it is beyond the scope of this work to take into account more complex issues about natural language dialogues. Therefore, some assumptions are made: non ambiguity: the two participants must agree on the meaning of the concepts being communicated; limited set of utterances: speci c communication acts are de ned, and utterances including other types of communication acts will not be considered. The dialogue manager module is completely independent from the other types of reasoning. Its task is to keep track of the conversation and to insure that some coherence is maintained (e.g. an answer should be followed by a reply etc.) but it is not concerned about the content of each utterance.
A consolidated approach to dialogue modelling is inspired by the metaphor of a game (Carlson 1983 ): the two conversants are viewed as players, each of them having a certain number of allowed moves in every situation of the game. Most commonly (Carletta 1992; Kowtko, Isard, & Doherty 1992; Pilkington et al. 1992) , di erent games are de ned for each possible type of interaction (for instance Inform game, Wh-ask game etc), with the constraint, for each participant, to complete a game before changing to another one, or at least to explicitly agree about starting a new game nested in the current one.
We follow Burton & Brna (1996) in taking a di erent approach, modelling the whole dialogue with a unique, large game. In this way all the possible theoretical games are interconnected, and the conversants can easily pass from one game to another. It is in principle possible, for instance, for an agent to be not cooperative and avoid answering a question.
Daphne's games can be represented as a state transition diagram, as shown in Fig. 5 , in which each move is represented by an arc connecting two states. In the gure, the two participants are identi ed as rst and second speaker. States associated with the rst speaker are identi ed with a solid box, those associated with the second speaker with a dashed box. The games are de ned by the following objects: the set of allowed states for each participant, some of which are identi ed as start states. The shadowed boxes in the gure represent valid starting states for the rst speaker. the sets of allowed moves. Each state is associated with three sets: 1. set of moves which the current speaker is allowed to make to keep on talking; in Fig. 5 they are represented by arcs having the same type as the state they depart from. 2. set of moves which the current speaker is allowed to make to follow up the current speaker game;
in Fig. 5 they are represented by arcs having the opposite type to the state they depart from. 3. set of moves the current hearer can perform to change game; in Fig. 5 they are represented by bold arcs. the set of action proposals associated with each state; that is suggestions about some goals that can be useful to follow up the conversation. For instance, after a question has been posed, the answer to that question is part of the action proposal sets to be given to the planner as a suggestion to follow up. These suggestions enters into the competition with the other goals already present in the agent's agenda, and will be taken into consideration or not, depending on a priority value. An example of priority value is the focus of the conversation: with this respect, an answer to a question will always have the highest priority. But other priority scales can be thought of, which can simulate a more opportunistic (and less cooperative) behaviour. query state: including all types of request that can be made to the opponent apart from the yes/no question (e.g. Why, Ask, DontUnderstand, etc.). YN query state: corresponding to yes/no questions. YN state: corresponding to the answer to a YN-question.
Characteristics of this game, as can be noticed from Fig. 5 , are that the players are allowed not to answer questions (bold arcs after a query state), and that more than one move can be made by the same participant before passing its turn, but conversants are constrained to pose only one question per turn. To simplify the transition net, it is demanded that the question must be the very last move of their turn. Also, the game is perfectly symmetrical with respect to the two participants.
The independence of the dialogue game de nition from the rest of the modules allows us to use a variety of games, as long as the formalism of the representation is kept. For example, a game can be used that, as opposed to the game in Fig. 5 , is not perfectly symmetrical with respect to the two participants, or allowing just one move per turn, etc.
The dialogue manager keeps track of a dialogue history, which is a stack of stacks: a new stack is initiated each time a bold arch is traversed, and the top-stack represents the current dialogue exchange.
The dialogue manager reads the incoming messages, sending messages for the updating to the belief revision module. It traverses the dialogue net, ensuring that the move is allowed and starting a new thread in the history when a bold arc is traversed; and updates the proper dialogue thread when answers are received. The action proposals associated with the new state are collected. When the agent holds the turn, the dialogue manager establishes, on the basis of the allowed action sets related to the state, whether the planner can go ahead in producing new utterances or the system should pass the turn to the user. Similarly, a message is produced when the opponent reaches a state from which no further move is allowed.
Daphne's Central Unit
Having detailed the various modules composing Daphne's architecture, a description of the coordinating central unit can be given. This consists of a xed cycle invoking the various components in turn:
1. activate the dialogue manager in order to read the incoming messages and update the dialogue history; 2. evaluate dialogue manager's new goal proposals, on the basis of the belief set, and to pass the appropriate ones to the planner; 3. activate the planner, on the basis of the messages to stop/go-ahead received from the dialogue manager;
4. manage the belief revision and query requests performed by both the planner and the dialogue manager;
5. activate the dialogue manager to output the set of messages received by the planner to be delivered to the addressee.
A Detailed Example
This section will show Daphne's behaviour with respect to the following short dialogue (system and user's turns are denoted with S and U respectively, followed by the number of the turn The rst two turns represent the assessment, for the system, of the user's stage of change with respect to the action of eating more fruit. A brief questionnaire to establish the stage of change is used, proposed by Prochaska, Norcross, & DiClemente (1994) .
After this stage, the actual argumentation begins.
S2
The system is trying to move the user from the precontemplation to the contemplation stage with respect to eating fruit. The general strategic operator (see Fig. 4 ) is instantiated as:
The decomposition refers to a tactician operator, so the control is passed to the next abstraction level. The evoked operator involves a pragmatic argumentation, labelled as \negative" because it stresses on what the proposed action avoids rather than achieves. Again, the general operator in Fig 4 is instantiated and binds the free variable ?perspective with the perspective (Health) from which the e ect that the action prevents has a Bad value, so suggesting to pass a Good value from the same perspective to the action itself.
Goal
PragmaticArgueNeg+ ( The Claim and Support operators refer to the orator abstraction level, producing the phrase in the dialogue above.
U2
The user communicated that:
Habit (EatingFruit, Granny) Supposing that the system considers the user cooperative, and then truthful, these beliefs are recorded both in the mutual section and the private section of its beliefs about the user: The reasoning module can now try to make some inferences with the new information. With the assumption that boredom is not a positive emotion: B S B U HasVal (Boring,Emotional,Bad) the system can infer that the same value is passed to EatingFruit; it is also inferred that in user's hierarchy the Emotional perspective has a higher position than the Health one; moreover, as it is supported by the fact that EatingFruit is presented as a Granny's habit, it is inferred that Granny is an anti-model for the user from the Emotional perspective. As the inferences are arbitrarily done by the system, they are considered \presumptions" and are stored in its private belief section about the user: 
S3
The dialogue manager, after analyzing the input message, can propose to the planner some countermoves. The main argument of the user involves a member/set relation (EatingFruit is a member of the Boring set). A response to this argument can be a Dissociation, if two instances of the set EatingFruit can be found with di erent values with respect to the Emotional perspective. The dissociation should emphasize a positive value. The tactician tries to dissociate the boredom of eating a general instance of fruit, to the \excitement" of eating avocados, by instantiating the Dissociate+ operator in Let us suppose, however, that the system cannot assume that the user will believe that EatingAvocados has a good emotional value, that is the prerequisite is not satis ed and needs to be planned for. The general tactician operator in Fig. 4 Notice again that the fact that Californians are a model for the user should be a \fact" (mutually known) otherwise the argument will be weak (unless, of course, the tactician is lucky enough to guess a right model for the opponent!).
Strategic and Tactical Considerations
It should be noticed how the strategist and the tactician share out the tasks for the presentation of the e ect of the action to promote. The strategist's responsibility is to just look for the e ects that the action prevents, achieves, weakens and so on. But it is the tactician's responsibility to evaluate the e ects properly: if the goal is to argue in favour of the action, it needs to promote what the action does and denigrate what the action does not do, and vice versa if the goal is to argue against the action. Also, the promotion and denigration should be accomplished from the addressee point of view.
After receiving the user's response, the system had several choices. A repair to the original plan could have been done at the strategic level: the user was not yet ready to move to the contemplator stage, and it could have been encouraged by increasing the user's perceived susceptibility to cancer, or by nding another e ect that EatingFruit can achieve or prevent.
At the tactician level, an alternative response to the member/set relation used by the user could have been another member/set (rather than a Dissociation), that is nding another set of which EatingFruit is member that has a good value from the Emotional perspective. Or, the user's supporting argument could have been attacked: an anti-model can be counter argued by a model (that is by nding a model whose habit is EatingFruit) or another anti-model (that is by nding an anti-model whose habit is not EatingFruit). The system could also have chosen not to follow the dialogue manager's suggestion, but rather to keep on arguing about EatingFruit, by applying the generic operator to pass a positive value to the action, either from the same emotional perspective or from a brand new one.
The choice among di erent strategies is guided by several factors. The focus of the conversation is one of them: answering a question, or counterarguing the opponent's last move, will make the dialogue smoother. Moreover, other argumentative issues can be taken into account and an agent will try to avoid weak strategies (e.g. based on presumptions rather than facts, or when a perspective is under discussion which is not high in the opponent's hierarchy).
Evaluation Issues
The Daphne prototype has been implemented in the ML programming language and an initial evaluation phase has just been completed, with the joint aim of both testing the soundness of the framework and collecting a corpus of dialogues in order to enrich the system's knowledge base. The phase consisted of two stages.
In a rst stage, ve researchers from the Department of Human Nutrition of the University of Glasgow were involved. After being described the aims of the project, they were asked to engage in a conversation via e-mail with a ctitious \user". User's responses were constructed by hand on the base of ve di erent \characters", but using Daphne's language and style of reasoning. Nutritionists were not constrained to use a particular language, or in the length of their replies, as the aim of the experiment was to collect some dialogues as \naturally" as possible. These dialogues were analyzed in term both of the behavioural models and the argumentative techniques, con rming that professional nutritionists actually act on such basis.
The nutritionist's responses obtained from the rst stage's dialogues were used to enrich Daphne's knowledge base, and then the second stage began. In this case, the situation was the opposite: some \users" were contacted via e-mail and solicited to engage in a conversation about diet. Daphne's responses were generated and then sent by hand to the user, again via e-mail. In this case as well, the participants were free to express their responses in any way they considered appropriate. The experiment lasted a month, involving 46 participants, and has just been completed. A nal questionnaire was sent to every participant to let them express their opinions about the experiment. The examination of the corpus of dialogues is under way, and promises to allow us to gain a wider knowledge about real arguments in favour and against the claim proposed by the system, which will furtherly enrich the nal version of the system. A preliminary analysis of the questionnaires suggests that most of the participants found Daphne's responses appropriate and informative.
Further Work
The design of Daphne was guided by the principle of practicality and simplicity, and the current arrangements proved to be suitable enough for the purposes of a coherent argumentative dialogue. Nevertheless, we believe that some interesting parts of the design deserve a deeper investigation, which we will leave as a further work.
The natural language generation component (that is the orator abstraction level of our planner) consists, for the time being, of a mere one-to-one translator in English of the speech act proposed. While this is de nitely acceptable for the purpose of the dialogue, as the messages generated are generally not long enough to justify a more complex mechanism, we plan a more thorough investigation into how to produce more e ective argumentative utterances. In particular, the applicability of the theory by Anscombre & Ducrot (1983) to our architecture is currently being studied.
A weak point in Daphne's argumentative style is that not much e ort is put on understanding the opponent's responses. They are generally considered separately and used to infer attitudes and beliefs of the addressee, but there is no explicit plan recognition of the opponent's argumentative schema. Suggestions about the counter-moves to use are captured in the action proposals sets collected by the Dialogue Manager, but it would be much more e ective to try guring out whether the opponent is using a particular argumentative schema, in order to nd a counter-schema to respond with.
Finally, some considerations about architectural choices can be made. As shown before, the agent's coordinating central unit consists of a xed cycle invoking the various components in turn. For the time being, this arrangement has revealed practical and suitable. Nevertheless the modularity of the components' design would allow us to implement the whole agent as a blackboard structure, and this possibility should be investigated.
On the evaluation side, a third phase has just began, and will consist of preparing a simpli ed Web version of Daphne's prototype, in order to let a wider population to have access to it via a Web site. We hope in this way to have a more signi cant evaluation of the arguments produced, in a setting which is closer to the interface we would envisage for Daphne than the e-mail environment.
